Introduction
Coalitional games are games in which agents can potentially benefit by cooperating [24, pp. 257-298] . Such games provide a natural and compelling model through which to understand cooperative action, and have been widely studied in the context of both natural and artificial multi-agent systems. In the game theory literature, two basic questions are asked in the context of coalitional games: Which coalitions will form? and How will the benefits of cooperation be shared within a coalition? With respect to the first question, solution concepts such as the core have been proposed, which try to capture the idea of rational participation in a coalition [24, p. 258] . With respect to the second question, solution concepts such as the Shapley value have been proposed, which attempt to define a "fair" distribution of the benefits of cooperation to agents within a coalition [24, p. 291] .
In the context of multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence, the use of coalitional game models and cooperative solution concepts raises a number of important issues. Perhaps the most fundamental issues are those of representing coalitional games, and reasoning with such representations. A number of researchers have developed models for coalitional games, and, given such models, have investigated the complexity of associated solution concepts, e.g., [10, 12, 13, 20, 23, 40, 41] . However, very little work has considered the kinds of logical, declarative representation schemes that are commonly used in the knowledge representation community [38] . There is good reason to suppose that such logic-based representations will be of value in reasoning about coalition games. For example, they can be used together with tools and techniques developed in AI and computer science [39] :
• As query languages, for expressing properties ϕ of coalitional games. Checking whether a game has property ϕ reduces to the model checking problem. • For directly reasoning about coalitional games via theorem proving.
• For expressing desirable properties ϕ of a coalitional game we want to synthesise. This corresponds to a constructive proof of satisfiability for ϕ.
Moreover, logical representation schemes are frequently succinct, compared to the alternatives. Logical representations of coalitional games might also be of value in game theory itself, as they open the door for automated reasoning tools such as theorem provers. Our aim in this paper is thus to develop and study logic-based knowledge representation formalisms for coalitional games (more precisely, coalitional games without transferable payoffs [24, p. 268] ). We develop two logical languages that are interpreted directly as statements of such games. We study the axiomatisation and computational complexity of these logical languages, and demonstrate how they can be used to characterise and reason about coalitional games:
• First, we develop a Coalitional Game Logic (cgl). Syntactically, cgl contains modal cooperation expressions of the form C ϕ, meaning that coalition C can achieve an outcome satisfying ϕ. In addition, cgl includes operators that make it possible to explicitly represent an agent's preferences over outcomes. The inclusion of an explicit mechanism for representing preferences makes cgl very different to cooperation logics such as atl [3] and Coalition Logic [27] , which otherwise might, at first sight, seem to be similar to cgl. However, the differences go much deeper than just introducing a way of representing preferences: we show in Section 5 that cgl is fundamentally incomparable to these logics. Note that we interpret formulae of cgl directly with respect to coalitional games without transferable payoff, thereby establishing an explicit link between formulae of the logic and properties of coalitional games.
• Second, we develop a Modal Coalitional Game Logic (mcgl), a normal modal logic interpreted directly in coalitional games by using the preference relations in coalitional games as modal accessibility relations.
Both logics can be used to characterise and reason about many important properties of coalitional games, such as nonemptiness of the core. They differ, however, in that cgl can only express such properties under the assumption that the possible outcomes of the games are finite, while mcgl does not have this restriction. On the other hand, if we make the finiteness assumption, cgl is more expressive than mcgl, while the latter can often express interesting properties such as non-emptiness of the core much more succinctly.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss related work, and introduce the basic mathematical framework of coalitional games and solution concepts for such games. cgl is introduced in Section 3. Following a presentation of the syntax and semantics of the logic, we give a number of technical results relating to it, as follows. First, we prove that the logic is expressively complete with respect to finite coalitional games without transferable payoff, in the sense that for any two different finite coalitional games, there exists a formula of cgl that will be true in one game and false in the other. We then give an axiomatisation of cgl, and show that it is sound and complete with respect to finite coalitional games. With respect to model checking and satisfiability, we show that while model checking for the logic is tractable, the satisfiability problem for cgl is np-complete. We present a tableau-based decision procedure for the logic, and to illustrate the use of the logic, we show how to axiomatically characterise a number of well-known solution concepts for coalitional games, including, for example, non-emptiness of the core of finite coalitional games. Finally, we give some examples of formal deductions in the logic. In Section 4 we introduce mcgl. After presenting the syntax and semantics, we present an axiomatisation, and prove that it is sound and complete with respect to all coalitional games. We illustrate the logic by expressing properties such as non-emptiness of the core of general (not necessarily finite) coalitional games, and by formally deriving some properties of coalitional games as theorems within the proof system. Finally, in Section 5, we compare cgl and mcgl, first to each other, and then to Coalition Logic, and we conclude in Section 6.
Background
Originally developed within the game theory community [4, 15, 22] , models of cooperative or coalitional games entered multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence research in the 1990s. Initial research focused on approaches to coalition formation. For example, Shehory and Kraus developed algorithms for coalition formation, in which agents were modelled as having different capabilities, and were assumed to benevolently desire some overall task to be accomplished, where this task had some complex (plan-like) structure [30] [31] [32] . Sandholm considered the closely-related problem of coalition structure generation, i.e., the problem of partitioning an overall set of agents into mutually disjoint coalitions, so that social welfare (the sum of individual coalition values) is maximised [29] .
More recently, the issue of representing coalitional games, and the complexity of computing with these representations, has received attention. The issue of representation-which is of course central to the field of artificial intelligence-is of particular importance in the context of coalitional games, as the obvious representations for them have completely unrealistic space requirements (see, e.g., the discussion in [40, pp. 34-41] ). Some effort has therefore been devoted to developing succinct representations for coalitional games. There are roughly two main lines of attack with respect to the problem of representing coalitional games, as follows.
• The second point to note is that a more common but less general definition of coalitional game is that of a coalitional game with transferable payoff, formalised as a pair N, v consisting of the set of players N together with a function v : 2 N → R associating a real number v(C ) with every group of players C . The intended interpretation of a game N, v is that v(C ) represents the payoff, or utility, that C could obtain should they choose to cooperate. It is easy to see that coalitional games without transferable utility are more general than coalitional games with transferable utility: we simply interpret V (C) as being the set of possible distributions of payoff v(C ) to members of C . 3 Henceforth, we use the term "coalitional game" to refer to the more general concept of a coalitional game without transferable utility, as defined above. A finite coalitional game is a coalitional game with a finite set of outcomes.
Example 1 (Dinner Game
4 ). Three agents must decide to go out for either Indian (I ), Chinese (C ) or Japanese ( J ) food. The majority will go where the majority decides: if all three agents decide to go for Indian they will do that; if two of the agents wants to go for Chinese the two agents will do that and the third agent will stay at home. To simplify the presentation in this example, we will define the preferences of agents by way of utilities: for every agent i we assume a utility function u i : Ω → R, so that u i (ω) denotes the utility agent i gets from outcome ω. These utility functions then induce preference relations in the obvious way. The utilities of the agents with respect to the outcome I , C , and J are as follows:
• each agent gets an additional unit of utility for each other agent that joins him,
• an agent who stays at home has a utility of 0.
The situation can be modelled by the following coalitional game:
• N = {1, 2 The following is a variant of the three-player majority game with an infinite set of outcomes.
Example 2 (Cake Game).
Three agents must decide how to divide a cake amongst them. Any majority can decide a division of the cake amongst themselves. We assume that each agent only cares about the amount of cake she gets: the more cake the better. The situation can be modelled by the following coalitional game:
3 Of course, Ω will be infinite in this case. 4 Based on an example given by Vincent Conitzer. 
Solution concepts for coalitional games
Game theory defines and studies different concepts related to coalitional games, in particular solution concepts such as, e.g., the core. It is desirable that formal logics for coalitional games, such as those introduced in the next two sections, are able to express and reason about such concepts. We discuss here three solution concepts from the theory of coalitional games, viz. the core [15] , stable sets [22] and the bargaining set [4] . Our formulation of these solution concepts follows that of [24] ; there the two latter solution concepts are however defined only for games with real numbered payoffs and transferable utility and below we translate the definitions to the more general games with preference relations over general outcomes and non-transferable utility.
A C -feasible outcome is an outcome which can be chosen by the coalition C ; thus ω is C -feasible if ω ∈ V (C). A feasible outcome is a N-feasible outcome, where N is the grand coalition. Thus, for example, the set {I 123 , C 123 , J 123 } represents the feasible outcomes for the Dinner Game (Example 1).
The first solution concept we consider is the core: the core of a game is a (possibly empty) set of outcomes.
Definition 1 (Core).
The core of a coalitional game is the set of feasible outcomes ω for which there exists no coalition C and C -feasible outcome ω such that ω a i ω for all i ∈ C .
An important property of a coalitional game is whether the core is empty or not. In the Dinner Game (Example 1) the core is empty: for example, if the three agents choose to go for Japanese food together, agents 1 and 2 would benefit from going for Chinese on their own instead. Similarly, the core of the Cake Game (Example 2) is empty. If the core of a game is empty, then the grand coalition is unstable, since by definition it means that some coalition could benefit by defecting from the grand coalition. Thus, the question "is the grand coalition stable" reduces to the question "is the core non-empty". Intuitively, if the core is non-empty, then we can think of the members of the core as being candidates for an outcome that the grand coalition might choose. 5 Like the core, a stable set is a set of outcomes. A coalitional game may have several stable sets, but need not necessarily have any. We characterise stable sets in terms of imputations and objections. Because we will discuss a different objection concept in the context of the bargaining set below, we will here use the term s-objection (stable set objection) to avoid confusion. An imputation is a feasible outcome that for each agent i is as least as good as any outcome the singleton coalition {i} can choose on his own. For example, in the Dinner Game (Example 1) the set of imputations is the set of all feasible outcomes {I 123 , C 123 , J 123 }. Also for the Cake Game (Example 2) all feasible outcomes are imputations. An imputation ω is a C -s-objection to an imputation ω if every agent in C strictly prefers ω over ω and the coalition C can choose an outcome which for every agent in C is as least as good as ω. The imputation ω is an s-objection to ω if ω is a C -s-objection to ω for some coalition C .
Definition 2 (Stable Set). A set of imputations Y is a stable set if it satisfies:
Internal stability If ω ∈ Y , there is no s-objection to ω in Y . External stability If ω is an imputation and ω / ∈ Y , there is an s-objection to ω in Y .
In the Dinner Game (Example 1), the set of all imputations {I 123 , C 123 , J 123 } is a stable set. An example of a stable set for the Cake Game (Example 2) is {(
Finally, we focus on the notion of a bargaining set of a coalitional game which is, like a stable set, a set of imputations, but, unlike a stable set, is unique and always exists. The bargaining set of a game can be defined in terms of objections and counterobjections, but the former concept is not the same as in the definition of stable sets. Let ω be an imputation: b-objection: A pair consisting of a coalition C and a C -feasible outcome ω is a b-objection of an agent i ∈ C against an agent j / ∈ C to ω if every agent in C strictly prefers ω over ω. We can now formulate the bargaining set.
Definition 3 (Bargaining Set).
The bargaining set of a coalitional game is the set of all imputations ω such that there exists a b-counterobjection to every b-objection of any player i against any player j to ω. 
For example, the bargaining set of the Cake Game (Example 2) is {(
)}.
A logic for finite coalitional games
We now define Coalitional Game Logic (cgl): a formalism for reasoning about coalitional games, which can express all interesting properties of finite coalitional games. We first define the syntax and the semantics of the logic. We then study its expressive power; axiomatisation; computational properties; and give a decision procedure for satisfiability. Finally we use the logic to characterise the solution concepts discussed above.
CGL: Syntax and semantics
In the language of cgl, we are able to explicitly refer to agents in N, coalitions in 2 N , and outcomes in Ω. The language must therefore contain symbols standing for elements of each of these domains. We let Σ N be a set of symbols for agents, Σ C be a set of symbols for coalitions, and Σ Ω be a set of symbols for outcomes, and let Σ = Σ N ∪ Σ C ∪ Σ Ω . Given these atomic building blocks, the language of cgl is defined in two parts.
• First, given a set of outcome symbols Σ Ω , we have an outcome language L o , defined by the grammar ϕ o , below, which expresses the properties of outcomes. The outcome symbols themselves are the main constructs of this language; a formula such as ω 1 ∨ ω 2 (where ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Σ Ω ) means that the outcome corresponds to either ω 1 or ω 2 .
• Second, given a set of agent symbols Σ N and a set of coalition symbols Σ C , we have a cooperation language L c , for expressing the properties of coalitional cooperation, and the preferences that agents have over possible outcomes. This language is generated by the grammar ϕ c below. L c has two main constructs. First, ω 1 i ω 2 (where ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Σ Ω , i ∈ Σ N ) expresses the fact that agent i either prefers outcome ω 1 over outcome ω 2 , or is indifferent between the two. Second, C ϕ (where C ∈ Σ C ) says that C can choose an outcome in which the formula ϕ will be true. 6 Formally, the grammar of cgl is defined as follows:
where σ i ∈ Σ N is an agent symbol, σ C ∈ Σ C is a coalition symbol, and σ ω , σ ω ∈ Σ Ω are outcome symbols.
To simplify our subsequent presentation, we exploit the direct correspondence between symbols for outcomes/agents/ coalitions and the outcomes/agents/coalitions that appear in games. Let C = 2 N \ ∅ denote the set of non-empty coalitions, henceforth simply called coalitions. In this paper, we will henceforth assume a one-to-one correspondence between Σ Ω and Ω, between Σ N and N and between Σ C and the set of coalitions C. So we assume that Σ Ω = {σ ω : ω ∈ Ω}, Σ N = {σ i : i ∈ N} and Σ C = {σ C : C ∈ C}. The languages are parameterised by the sets Σ Ω , Σ N , Σ C , i.e., as a consequence of the assumption, by some set N of agents and set Ω of outcomes. In the following, we assume that these two parameters-and thus the languages-are fixed.
The language of Coalitional Game Logic is L c ; it expresses statements about coalitional games. An L c formula γ is interpreted in a coalitional game Γ as follows, where Γ | γ means that γ is true in Γ . As mentioned it is assumed that the agents N and outcomes Ω are fixed, so when we talk about coalitional games in the context of cgl we implicitly mean coalitional games over agents N and outcomes Ω. Said in another way, the formulae of the language are defined as statements about games with a certain set of agents and a certain set of outcomes, and formally interpreted in such games.
First, we define the satisfaction of an L o formula α in an outcome ω of a coalitional game Γ over N and Ω, written Γ, ω | α:
When Γ | ϕ for every Γ over N and Ω, we write | ϕ and say that ϕ is valid. To simplify the text that follows, we abuse notation somewhat, and write ω for both an outcome (a semantic construct) and the corresponding symbol σ ω in the language (a syntactic construct). Similarly, we will write i instead of σ i for agents in the language, and C instead of σ C for coalitions. So, we will just write C ω for σ C σ ω , although the reader should be aware of the distinction between our object language L c and the objects that live in the semantics: outcomes, agents and their preferences, and coalitions.
We will use the usual derived propositional connectives:
is the usual constant for truth, ϕ ∧ ψ stands for ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ),
Note that C is true iff C can at least bring about something: V (C) = ∅.
[C]ϕ means that ¬ C ¬ϕ, i.e., every choice of C must involve ϕ. As an example, suppose Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 } and V (C) = {ω 1 , ω 2 }. Then the following formula is true:
Note that if ω 1 = ω 2 , then we can have C ω 1 ∧ C ω 2 , but the formula C (ω 1 ∧ ω 2 ) can never be true.
Example 3. Let Γ be the Dinner Game from Example 1. We have the following:
• Γ | 1, 2 I 12 ∧ [1]¬I 12 . Agents 1 and 2 can choose to go for Indian together, but 1 cannot choose on his own that they go together.
• Γ | ω∈Ω ¬ 1 ω. Agent 1 cannot choose any outcome on his own.
•
The agents can together choose something which for 1 is better than going for Indian together with 2.
. Agents 1 and 3 cannot choose that all agents go for Chinese, but they can choose something which is strictly better for both of them (e.g., going for Indian on their own).
• Γ | ω∈Ω ¬ω 1 I 123 . Agent 1 prefers nothing better than having Indian with his two friends. A formula of this form is said to fully describe C 's choices. It is easy to see that we have the following. Let Δ ⊆ Ω be finite.
δ∈∅ ϕ is, by convention, equal to , in the same way that δ∈∅ ϕ equals ⊥, so that, indeed, we get
Exclusive disjunctions ϕ ψ will play an important role in the proofs which follow. Note that the negation ¬(ϕ ψ) is the same as (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ). Moreover, if Φ is a set of formulas, then we define ϕ∈Φ ϕ to be true iff exactly one of the ϕ's is true. Formally, for any set Φ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k }, 
So, which properties of a coalitional game can be expressed with our cooperation language? The answer, given by the following theorem, is "all", when we restrict the possible outcomes of a game to a finite set. Proof. Our proof is constructive. Given a finite game Γ , we define a formula ζ Γ that completely characterises Γ . ζ Γ is constructed from two conjuncts, Π Γ , which characterises the preference relations of Γ , and Ξ Γ , which characterises the cooperative properties of Γ . Let C = 2 N \ ∅ collect all non-empty coalitions from N.
ω∈V (C) 
By construction, for any Γ 1 , we have Γ 1 | ζ Γ 1 . Moreover, for any coalitional game Γ 2 = Γ 1 , we have that Γ 2 | ζ Γ 1 . P Given a formula ϕ, let coal(ϕ) denote the set of coalitions named in ϕ; let ag(ϕ) denote the set of agents named in cooperation expressions or preference expressions in ϕ; and let out(ϕ) be the set of outcomes named in ϕ.
Axioms and completeness
We now present an axiomatic system in the language L c , and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to the class of all finite coalitional games without transferable payoff.
From now on we assume that Ω is finite. Table 1 summarises the axioms and rules of our logic cgl. Formally, cgl is the set of all L c -formulas derivable under .
In the axioms, c denotes derivability of classical logic, and ϕ o ∈ L o , ϕ, ψ ∈ L c . The axiom Taut and rule MP guarantee that we extend classical logic. On top of that, the axiom K and rule Nec determine [C] to be a normal necessity operator. Then,
Lin, Ref , and
Trans determine the preference of each i to be complete, reflexive and transitive, respectively. The only specific cooperation axiom, Func, says that whatever a coalition in the end will chose, it must be a unique alternative from Ω.
We now continue by proving results about the cgl proof system, including its completeness. Examples of derivations can be found in Section 3.6.
The following lemma tells us that in the scope of modal operators, disjunctions over different outcomes behave the same as exclusive disjunctions over outcomes. Note that this is in general not true for arbitrary disjunctions: C (ω 1 ∨ ω 1 ) is not the same as C (ω 1 ω 1 ); the latter is equivalent to C ⊥.
(1) The following are equivalent, in cgl: (i) C , (ii) C ω∈Ω ω, and (iii) C ω∈Ω ω. (2) In the scope of C and [C] when exchanging arbitrary occurrences of ω∈Δ ω with that of ω∈Δ ω in a formula ϕ, the result is equivalent to ϕ.
Proof.
(1) Since ω∈Ω ω ⇒ ω∈Ω ω ⇒ , and the C is a normal diamond operator, we have (iii) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (i). By Func, we
(2) With induction over ϕ. The only interesting case ϕ = C ψ follows from the previous item. (1) C = ∅ be a coalition. Then (1) Note that C ω is just an atom in the coalitional language. Let M = {1, . . . ,n}. Then, even by propositional reasoning,
. Now, take a fixed I and J with I ∩ J = ∅ and (2) Note that, using the notation of the previous item, we even have
From this the statement follows directly. (3) This is immediate from item 1: if for an arbitrary C we have
(4) Follows from item 2 in the same way as 3 follows from 1.
(5) This follows immediately from item 1 and propositional reasoning: note that for every two coalitions C 1 and C 2 we derive
(1) For any agent i, we say that a formula is a preference literal for i if it is either ω i ω or ¬(ω i ω ), for some ω and ω . We say that π i fully describes i's preferences, if π i is of the form ω,ω ∈Ω (¬)(ω i ω ). We then say that π ∈ PossPref (i). Complex as it may appear, our normal form is nothing more than an enumeration of possible full preferences combined with full descriptions of choices. The range of these possibilities is determined by the index sets K and T , which act like constraints: the smaller those index sets, the smaller the possible models for the formula. As a reading guide, note that k∈{1,2}, t∈{a,b} 
Proof. Note that the theorem is semantically obvious, the point is that we should be able to syntactically prove it from the axioms given. This is done by induction over ϕ.
Let us say that a π k is k-compatible with (ω 1 k ω 2 ) if the latter occurs as a conjunct in π k . We then write (ω 1 k ω 2 ) ∈ π k . Then, ϕ is (in propositional logic) equivalent to 
which, by propositional reasoning, is equivalent to
Formula ϕ 0 regards outcomes, and is equivalent to a disjunction α where each α is of the form
Using rule Nec and axiom K , we derive
Using that · is a diamond, we then obtain that
Now we use axiom Func to get rid of every α that contains more than one positive literal ω i : let β range over all the those α's with at most one positive literal. Then E ϕ 0 ↔ E β. Now, again in propositional logic, note that every disjunction i∈M ψ i is equivalent to
In our case, letting the β's range over β 1 , . . . , β M ,
Hence, we find that
This only limits the abilities of C , and not those of the others: using Lemma 2 item 5 once again:
of which the r.h.s. is of the form C ∈C,t∈T ( [C] Δ C ) t , for some index set T . Since is provably equivalent with k∈K Π k (where now K gives all possible full preference descriptions), the result follows.
Suppose ϕ is of the form ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 . We can assume that
which is of the required form.
, for some index sets K and T . From Lemma 3, item 2, we know that
In words: we know that a big disjunction is valid, but also that ϕ excludes some of them. Then, using
propositional reasoning again, we obtain:
Proof. Suppose ϕ, i.e., ¬ϕ is consistent. We know that for some index sets K and T . Call the right-hand side of this equivalence ϕ . Let X be a maximal consistent set around ϕ . By virtue of maximal consistent sets, we know that for some k and
(1) N and Ω are already given;
Now, it is easy to see, for every sub-formula ψ of ϕ :
Model checking and the complexity of satisfiability
It is easy to see that the model checking problem for cgl (i.e., the problem of determining, for any given game Γ and ϕ, whether or not Γ | ϕ [7] ) may be solved in deterministic polynomial time: an obvious recursive algorithm for this problem can be directly extracted from the semantic rules of the language.
The satisfiability problem is the problem of checking whether or not, for any given ϕ there exists a game Γ such that Γ | ϕ. For most modal logics, the corresponding satisfiability problem has a trivial np-hard lower bound, since such logics subsume propositional logic, for which satisfiability is the defining np-complete problem [6, p. 374] . However, our logic is specialised for reasoning about coalitional games, and it is not so obvious that it subsumes propositional logic, since we do not have primitive propositions. We must therefore prove np-hardness from first principles.
For the proof, we need a few additional constructions. A partial coalitional game is a structure
where all the components are as in regular coalitional games, except that V is a partial function, i.e., it is not required to be defined for every possible coalition. Given a partial game Γ = N, Ω, V , 1 , . . . , m , we can use the semantic rules for cgl to interpret some formulae (although because V is not defined for all coalitions, we cannot necessarily interpret all formulae over N, Ω). Where Γ is a partial game and ϕ is a formula, let us write Γ | p ϕ to mean that (i) it is possible to evaluate ϕ with respect to Γ , and (ii) ϕ is true under this evaluation. Now, we can prove the following.
Lemma 4. A cgl formula ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists a partial game
Proof. The right-to-left direction is obvious, so consider the left-to-right direction, and
A is the set of outcomes in Γ not named in ϕ. Let ω * be an outcome such that ω * / ∈ Ω, and define a partial game Γ * = N * , Ω * , V * , * 1 , . . . , * o as follows:
• The relation * i is obtained by first restricting i to out(ϕ), and then defining ω * a i ω for all ω ∈ out(ϕ); • V * is the partial function such that V * is only defined for coalitions named in ϕ (i.e., C ∈ domV * iff C ∈ coal(ϕ));
Notice that Γ * satisfies conditions (1)- (3) of the lemma. We now prove that Γ * satisfies condition (4) . More precisely, we show that for all sub-formulae ψ of ϕ: Γ | ψ iff Γ * | ψ . The inductive base is where ϕ = (ω 1 i ω 2 ), and is obvious, since i ∈ ag(ϕ) and {ω 1 , ω 2 } ⊆ out(ϕ), and hence ω 1 *
For the inductive assumption, assume the result is proved for all sub-formulae; in the inductive step, the significant case Proof. For membership of np, we know that ϕ is satisfiable iff it has a "certificate" for this in the form of a partial game Γ as in Lemma 4. This partial game is of size linear in the size of the formula ϕ. Since we can check whether Γ | p ϕ in polynomial time, we conclude that cgl satisfiability is in np.
For np-hardness, we reduce sat, the problem of determining whether a formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) of propositional logic, over Boolean variables x 1 , . . . , x k , has a satisfying assignment [25] . The basic idea is to map variables x i to outcomes ω i , to introduce an additional outcome ω ⊥ to correspond to the truth value "false", so that (ω x 1 ω ⊥ ) will mean "x takes the value 'true' ". Formally, let ϕ # denote the cgl formula obtained from the propositional logic formula ϕ by systematically replacing every Boolean variable p by the corresponding cgl expression (ω p 1 ω ⊥ ). Now, we claim that ϕ # is cgl satisfiable iff the input sat instance ϕ is a satisfiable formula of propositional logic.
For the ⇒ direction, assume ϕ # is cgl satisfiable, and consider the associated preference relation 1 • For each Boolean variable p such that p is false under ξ , define ω ⊥ i ω p .
• For each pair of Boolean variables p 1 , p 2 such that p 1 is true (respectively, false) and p 2 is false (respectively, true)
A decision procedure for satisfiability
Although Theorem 4 classifies the complexity of the satisfiability problem for cgl, it does not give us a direct decision procedure for establishing satisfiability. Now, the nature of np-completeness immediately indicates one possible decision procedure: iterate through all possible partial models for the formula, checking each one in turn to see whether it satisfies the input formula. However, such an approach would surely be completely impracticable. In this section, we present an algorithm for satisfiability checking that was specifically developed for cgl. This approach is based on the method of analytic tableaux. The basic idea of such methods is to use the structure of a formula to guide the search for a satisfying model; while in the worst case tableaux methods do no better than naive search, in many cases they prove highly efficient. Tableaux methods have been widely applied for satisfiability checking in both classical and non-classical logics (see, e.g., [19, 33] ), and in particular have proven to be very effective in practice for modal and temporal logics [18] .
To introduce the decision procedure, we need some subsidiary definitions and assumptions. First, throughout the procedure, we assume that double negations (¬¬) are eliminated whenever they occur by the standard logical equivalence ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ. Second, we will assume that bi-conditionals have been eliminated by expanding them according to their definition, leaving only the classical operators ∨, ∧, →, and ¬ in a formula. Now, we say an α-formula of L o or L c is one in which the outermost logical operators of the formula define a conjunction, while a β-formula is one where the outermost logical operators define a disjunction. Given an α-formula ϕ, we denote the conjuncts of this formula by α 1 (ϕ) and α 2 (ϕ), respectively, and we similarly assume β 1 (ϕ) and β 2 (ϕ) give the disjuncts of β-formula ϕ. The following table defines the functions α i and β i (see, e.g., [33, p. 21] ).
formulae, then we say that S is:
• proper if whenever ϕ ∈ S, we have ¬ϕ / ∈ S, and improper otherwise.
Phase 1: Decomposing the L c formula
We can now present the first stage of the satisfiability checking algorithm. The basic idea is to systematically decompose an L c formula using α-and β-functions, in much the same way as classical tableaux [33] . In the classical case, the process results in a set of sets of propositional literals; each such set represents one way that the original formula could be satisfied, JID:ARTINT AID:2371 /FLA [m3G; v 1.62; Prn:24/09/2008; 9:15] P.13 and each such set of literals is itself easily checked for satisfiability. In our case, we do not end up with sets of propositional literals, but with sets of preference literals and coalition literals; nevertheless, each such set represents one possible way the original input formula might be satisfied. Later stages check these sets for satisfiability, dealing with preference literals and coalition literals.
We will say a root is a set of L c formulae together with a labelling, which tells us for every member of the set whether the formula is treated or untreated. A pre-tableaux is a set of roots.
Given an input formula ϕ ∈ L c , we start with a pre-tableaux R = {{ϕ}} in which ϕ is untreated. We then iteratively repeat the following steps:
(1) If R contains a root S such that S is improper, then delete S from R.
(2) If R contains a root S with an untreated α-formula ϕ, then: (a) create a new root S from S, with S = S ∪ {α 1 (ϕ), α 2 (ϕ)} where ϕ is now labelled as "treated" and α 1 (ϕ) and α 2 (ϕ) are labelled as "untreated";
(b) remove S from R and add S to R .
(3) If R contains a root S with an untreated β-formula ϕ, then: (a) create a new root S 1 , set S 1 := S ∪ {β 1 (ϕ)} with ϕ now labelled as "treated" and β 1 (ϕ) as "untreated"; (b) create a new root S 2 , set S 2 := S ∪ {β 2 (ϕ)} with ϕ now labelled as "treated" and β 2 (ϕ) as "untreated";
(c) remove S from R and add S 1 and S 2 to R . (4) If R contains no roots to which the above rules can be applied, then quit.
Let R (ϕ) be the set of roots obtained by applying the above procedure to input cgl formula ϕ. No member of R (ϕ) will contain any untreated α-or β-formula. It is easy to see that, for any S ∈ R (ϕ), the only untreated formulae will be of the form:
Essentially, the next two phases of the procedure deal with these two classes of formulae.
Phase 2: Dealing with preference literals
The second stage of the decision procedure deals with preference literals. The idea is simply to eliminate any roots that correspond to inherently contradictory sets of preference literals. Given a set S of L c formula, we denote by prlit(S) the set of preference literals it contains. Now, clearly, prlit(S) will induce a collection of preference relations, one for each agent named in an atom in prlit(S).
At this stage what we simply need to check is that the relations induced in this way are indeed preference relations: they are complete, reflexive, and transitive. To do this we use a closure procedure. The idea of the closure procedure is to take a set of preference literals, and then from this generate sets of preference literals corresponding to every possible preference ordering. For prlit(S) to be satisfiable, it must be consistent with some such set. We generate the closure in two parts: the first deals with the requirement that preference relations must be complete, the second deals with reflexivity and transitivity.
The completeness requirement on preference relations dictates that, for every agent i and every pair of outcomes ω, ω we have either (ω i ω ) or (ω i ω). Thus, we start by generating the set of all such combinations. The algorithm for this is as follows:
Let Y (ϕ) denote the set of sets of preference literals obtained from cgl formula ϕ by this process. Next, we replace each root S ∈ R (ϕ) with S combined with every combination of sets of preference literals in Y (ϕ). The idea is that, if a root S ∈ R (ϕ) is satisfiable, then it will be compatible with at least one of the sets in Y (ϕ).
Finally, we exhaustively apply the following rules to R (ϕ), until no new applications of these rules are possible. [m3G; v 1.62; Prn:24/09/2008; 9:15] P.14 (1-35)
Intuitively, the first step corresponds to generating the reflexive closure of the preference relations, while the second step corresponds to taking the transitive closure. Where X is a set of preference literals, then we say X is closed for preference literals iff:
(1) for every pair of outcomes ω, ω named in X , and every agent i named in X , either (ω i ω ) or (ω i ω); (2) for every outcome ω named in X , and every agent i named in
Now, the point about closure for preference literals is the following. So, to conclude the second stage of the decision procedure, we delete from R (ϕ) any set S that is no longer proper as a result of the closure procedure. Let R(ϕ) be the structure obtained from R (ϕ) by applying the closure procedure and then deleting from it any roots that are no longer proper.
It should be clear that what we are doing in the above procedure is taking each root S, and then systematically trying to find an extension of S that is proper and closed for preference literals. The search is systematic in the sense that it considers all possible alternatives.
Phase 3: Creating branches from choices
We now move into the third stage of the procedure, where we deal with modal literals. At this point, our structures become richer, not simply having roots, but branches, where each branch will correspond to a choice of a set of agents. To see how this stage works, consider that an existential cooperation modality C ψ asserts the existence of a choice for coalition C (they have a choice satisfying ψ ), while a universal modality, of the form ¬ C ψ , asserts a constraint on the choices of C : every choice they have satisfies ¬ψ . This stage of the procedure thus attempts to construct choices corresponding to each existential modality, where these choices must respect the constraints imposed by the relevant universal cooperation modalities.
Some more definitions are needed. An outcome literal is either an outcome symbol ω or the negation of such a symbol, ¬ω. We say an L o formula ψ is outcome-satisfiable if for some Γ, ω we have Γ, ω | ψ . We say a set of outcome formulae Y is outcome-proper if it is proper and moreover for no ω 1 and ω 2 is it the case that both ω 1 ∈ Y and ω 2 ∈ Y . The key point about outcome-proper sets of outcome literals is the following readily proved result.
Lemma 6. Let Y be a set of outcome literals. Then the outcome formula μ∈Y μ is outcome-satisfiable iff it is outcome-proper.
A tableau, Υ , is a set of pairs (S, B), where S ⊆ L c and B ⊆ 2 ag(ϕ) × 2 L o is a set of branches; S will be a root of R(ϕ), while B will be a set of choices corresponding to the modal formulae in S.
Given a structure R(ϕ) as generated from a cgl formula ϕ by the above procedure, we create a tableau Υ (ϕ) using the following procedure.
(1) initialise Υ (ϕ) to be empty; (2) for each S ∈ R(ϕ), add a pair, (S, B S ) to Υ (ϕ), where B S is constructed as follows: (a) initialise B S to ∅, (b) for each coalition C ∈ coal(ϕ), and for each formula C ψ ∈ S, let
We now apply α-and β-rules as introduced earlier in each branch of Υ (ϕ). Now, however, we delete any branches obtained that are not outcome-proper. (Intuitively, a branch corresponds to a choice of a coalition, and a choice is a single member of Ω.) Let Υ (ϕ) be the tableau obtained from Υ (ϕ) by deleting outcome-improper branches.
Phase 4: Checking the tableau
We say a tableau Υ is finished for the cgl formula ϕ iff: 
The key point about finished tableaux is the following.
Theorem 5.
A cgl formula ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists a finished tableaux for ϕ.
Proof. (⇒)
Assume ϕ is satisfiable, and let Γ be the witness to this. Then we can immediately construct a finished tableau Υ Γ for ϕ from Γ . (⇐) Assume Υ is a finished tableau for ϕ. Then we can immediately "read off" from Υ a partial game Γ Υ that satisfies ϕ. P So, given a cgl formula ϕ, which we want to test for satisfiability, our decision procedure is then as follows:
(1) Generate the tableau Υ (ϕ) using the procedure described above. (2) Check that the tableau Υ (ϕ) generated in this way is finished; if so, announce "ϕ is satisfiable", otherwise announce "ϕ is unsatisfiable".
That the procedure is correct and is guaranteed to terminate is immediate from construction.
Characterising coalitional games
We characterise the three solution concepts from the theory of coalitional games discussed in Section 2.1.
We write CM(ω) to mean that ω is in the core.
CNE will then mean that the core is non-empty:
Theorem 6. The core of a finite coalitional game Γ over N and Ω is non-empty iff Γ | CNE.
Moving on to stable sets, the cgl formula IMP(ω) is true whenever ω is an imputation:
Next, OBJ(ω, ω , C ) expresses that outcome ω is an C -s-objection to outcome ω , when both ω and ω are imputations:
Given a set of outcomes Y ⊆ Ω, the cgl formula STABLE(Y ) expresses the fact that Y is a stable set: Finally, we consider the bargaining set.
means that outcome ω ∈ Ω is in the bargaining set: Proof. It is easy to see that when ω is an imputation, C is a coalition, 
Proof examples
We briefly illustrate the proof system by formally deducing some well known properties of coalitional games.
Example 4.
(1) Every member of the core is an imputation: Taut   Fig. 1 . Every member of the core is an imputation: a deductive proof.
CM(ω) → IMP(ω)
The first part (2) The core is a subset of any stable set:
Proof. The first part of the proof is shown in Fig. 1 , the second in Fig. 2 . P
A modal logic for coalitional games
In this section we study the logic of coalitional games from an alternative perspective: modal logic. We introduce Modal Coalitional Game Logic (mcgl), a modal logic interpreted in coalitional games. The language is similar to the language of cgl-in particular one of the main constructs of the language is an operator C for each coalition. The meaning of this operator is however radically different.
After we have introduced the language and its interpretation, introduced an axiomatic system, and shown that the system is sound and complete, we show how the logic can be used to express concepts like the core for general (not necessarily finite) coalitional games. The relationship between cgl and mcgl is studied in detail in Section 5.
mcgl: Syntax and semantics
The language of mcgl is interpreted as statements about an outcome in a coalitional game. One of the main constructs is modalities C for each coalition C . A formula of the form C ϕ is intended to mean that C prefers ϕ. In more detail, C ϕ, interpreted in outcome ω of coalitional game Γ , is intended to mean that there exists an outcome ω (possibly different from ω), which is weakly preferred over ω by each agent in C and in which ϕ is true. Similar modalities are used by [16] in the context of non-cooperative game theory. Another main construct is atomic propositions of the form p C , where C is JID
So, for example, C p C means that there exists a C -feasible outcome which is weakly preferred over the current outcome by each member of C . There are also operators C s standing for strict, rather than weak, preference. Furthermore, there
are converse operators C c and C sc ; C c ϕ ( C sc ϕ) is intended to mean that there is an outcome over which the current outcome is weakly (strictly) preferred and in which ϕ is true. Finally, there is an operator D such that D ϕ is intended to mean that ϕ is true in some outcome different from the current one. In addition to the atomic propositions p C for each coalition C , the language is parameterised by a set Θ of general primitive atomic proposition symbols. These stand for arbitrary propositions which can be true or false statements about an outcome in a game.
Let N be a set of agents, and let C = 2 N \ ∅ be the coalitions (we henceforth assume that a coalition is never empty).
, where Θ is a countably infinite set of primitive propositions, is defined as follows. Let
be the atomic propositions in the language. The language is defined by the following grammar:
The following definitions will be useful:
. . , m ) be a coalitional game, and let π be a valuation of Θ in Ω, i.e., π(p) ⊆ Ω for each p ∈ Θ . The fact that a formula ϕ is satisfied by the combination of Γ , π and an outcome w ∈ Ω, denoted Γ, π, w | ϕ, is defined recursively as follows: • Γ, I 12 | p {1,2} ∧ ¬p 1 . Agents 1 and 2 can choose to go for Indian together, but 1 cannot choose on his own that they go together.
• Γ, I 123 | ¬p 1 ∧ ¬ D p 1 . Agent 1 cannot choose any outcome on his own.
• Γ, I 12 | 1 s p {1,2,3} . The agents can choose something which for 1 is better than going for Indian together with 2.
• Γ, C 123 | (¬p {1,3} ) ∧ {1, 3} s p {1,3} . Agents 1 and 3 cannot choose that all agents go for Chinese, but they can choose something which is strictly better for both of them (e.g., going for Indian on their own).
• 
where ψ is the result of uniformly replacing atomic propositions in ϕ with arbitrary formulae
Axiomatisation
In this section we construct a sound and complete axiomatisation by viewing the logic as a normal modal logic. In particular, the basic accessibility relations in this logic are the individual preference relations i .
Let MCGL be the axiomatic system defined in Table 2 .
Let us briefly reflect upon the axioms. Axiom K (P) and rules Nec(P) and USub say that the logic is a normal modal logic. T and 4 say that each i is a pre-order. By Trichonomy, relation i moreover satisfies completeness. The Converse 1 (ξ ) and Converse 2 (ξ ) axioms ensure that the relation denoted by the ξ c modality is the converse of the relation denoted by the ξ modality. The axioms for the D-operator, as well as the D-rule are relatively standard in modal logic (see [6] Strict 3 together ensure that the relation denoted by the i s modality is the strict version of i . Note that this implies that the former is irreflexive. Finally, taking Intersect k for k = 1, 3 guarantees that the relation denoted by the C modality is the intersection over all i ∈ C of all i , and for k = 2, 4 it ensures that the relation denoted by the C s modality is the intersection over all i ∈ C of the strict version of i .
Examples of deductions in MCGL can be found in Section 4.4. The remainder of this section is concerned with proving that MCGL is sound and complete with respect to all coalitional games. The main result is found in Corollary 3.
Soundness and completeness
To make it more convenient to use standard modal logic tools, we will here interpret the logical language explicitly in a certain class of Kripke structures rather than in coalitional games. We show that MCGL is sound and complete with respect to this class, and it follows that it is sound and complete with respect to all coalitional games since these Kripke structures can be seen as coalitional games (Corollary 3 below).
Given a set of agents N and primitive propositions Θ , a model is a tuple: 
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Defined this way, our representation of a model contain a lot of redundant information, but this definition makes it easy to use standard modal logic tools directly. For the truth-definition, it is convenient to use the following notation.
Definition 5. For a diamond like C s , we call C s its parameter. We use ξ for an arbitrary parameter. The set of parameters is Ξ . For every parameter ξ ∈ Ξ , we define its associated relation Rel(ξ ) in a straightforward way, and, conversely, given an accessibility relation R, we define its parameter Par(R), such that Rel(Par(R)) is the identity function on accessibility relations, and Par(Rel(ξ )) being the identity function on parameters.
The interpretation of a formula in a state w of a model M is defined as follows (Boolean connectives as usual), where we use the same satisfaction symbol | we used for the interpretation in games without risk of confusion:
A frame is a tuple F = (W , The models carry a lot of dependencies between different accessibility relations. It is now the challenge of the soundness and completeness proof that we can characterise these dependencies in our object language. 
Theorem 9 (Soundness
would typically work if SEM has some property P that is not modally definable, and for which no canonical formula exists. The latter means that can(M) will not have property P , but the first might facilitate transforming can(M) into M that does have the property P , while M having the same validities as can(M). An example of such a property P would be INTERSECTION, say that R 3 = R 1 ∩ R 2 (cf. [35] ). The axiom A : [35] ).
However, if there are other relations or properties that need to be maintained or achieved at the same time, such a manipulation of the canonical model can become extremely difficult. For an example of this, we refer to [36] , where the canonical model for a system with individual knowledge (with relation R i ), Everybody's knowledge (with R E , the union of the R i 's), Common knowledge (R C , the transitive closure of R E ) and Distributed Knowledge (R D , the intersection of the R i 's) neither satisfies the desired property for R C , nor for R D , and, although there are well-known techniques to solve the problem for R C and for R D individually, those techniques applied here fix the problem for one relation, while ruining it for the other.
Rather than starting with the big canonical model for a logical system and then unravel it, duplicate worlds, or look at sub-models, [6] presents a 'step by step' technique, which we will follow here for our completeness proof. This technique is extremely useful in case one can go "back-and-forth" in a model, i.e., having a relation that allows one to look in both directions of the Kripke model. We will now first briefly sketch the procedure before the proof is given in detail below. Take a consistent formula ϕ. Following [6] , we build a network N to satisfy it. Such a network is a set of states with relations between them, but we start small, building up the network gradually. As a start, we add ϕ to some type Λ(s) (such a type collects all the formulas that should be true at s) of an initial state in an initial network N 1 . But if ϕ implies some ξ ψ formula, this N 1 is not good enough of course, our network has a defect, and we need to extend the network with a node t with ψ ∈ Λ(t) and mark, using a labelling d, that s and t are Rel(ξ ) related. So, if some N i has a defect, we either add a node, or an edge, or a formula to some type, to obtain a network N j ( j > i) that does not have the defect. Special attention has to be paid to the D-operator: in the end, we have to make sure that the arcs in N that are labelled with D, can be interpreted as inequality. In particular, D must not be reflexive, and it must be 'almost universal': hold between any two different nodes. To this end, we make sure that the network that we build is named: for every node s that we allow in N i , we make sure that there is some formula ψ ∧ ¬ D ψ ∈ Λ(s) in some network N j ( j > i). The network that we are after is
So don't we need the canonical model can(M) for MCGL at all? We do: in the network N , every edge has a unique label, and this will never be sufficient to get all the properties of MCGL. 
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Note that Δ(N , s) is a (finite) formula for any (finite and acyclic) network. We argue that Δ(N , s) is consistent iff Δ(N , t) is consistent, for any two nodes in any network N . We show this for any (s, t) ∈ E; the property follows for arbitrary s, t ∈ N by induction on the length of the least path from s to t (N is connected). Let (s, t) ∈ E, and first assume that d({s, t}) = R i and r({s, t}) = s. We have that Δ (N , s) 
We now show that for any defect in a coherent network N , there is a coherent network N extending N lacking that effect. Let Y be a countably infinite set; we will use the elements of Y as states when we need to add new states to the networks in order to repair defect D3. 
D2(s)
Let p be an atomic proposition in Θ not occurring in Δ(N , s) (it exists since Θ = Θ ∪ {p C : C ∈ C} is infinite-Θ was assumed to be countably infinite). The following is an alternative statement of the D-rule:
If Φ is consistent and does not contain p 
D3(s, ξ ϕ)
We define N as follows: Δ(N , s) . Thus, N is coherent.
D4(s, ξ
c ϕ) We define N as follows: 
Fix an enumeration of possible defects of a network whose nodes are included in the set Y , i.e., an enumeration of the
for each natural number i as follows.
• N 0 has a single node y ∈ Y labelled with {φ}. Clearly, N 0 is coherent.
• When n > 0, N n+1 is the (coherent) network obtained by repairing the least (according to the enumeration) defect, by the rules given above.
Note that N j extends N i when i < j. Also observe that a repaired defect will never be reintroduced, i.e., if N n+1 is obtained from N n by repairing defect D, then for every m n + 1 the network N m lacks the defect D. Importantly, it follows that for any i, for any defect of N i there is a j > i such that N j lacks that defect.
Let N = (N, E, d We will now define a sub-model of the canonical model of the logic, by restricting the states to the MCSs W . (N, Θ) ; can(R)w v iff ψ ∈ v implies that Qψ ∈ w for any ψ and any relation can(R) with corresponding diamond Q; can(π )(p) = {w ∈ can(W ): p ∈ w} for each p ∈ Θ. 
We argue that for any
where can(R) is the canonical relation interpreting the diamond Q. We show this for Q = i ; the argument is analogous in the other cases (including the converses). Let Γ ∈ W and let i ψ ∈ Γ . Let s ∈ N be such that Γ = Λ(s), and let i be such that i ψ ∈ Λ i (s). By the construction there is a j i and a t ∈ N j such that {s, t} ∈ E j , d({s, t}) = R i , r({s, t}) = s, and ψ ∈ Λ j (t). Thus, ψ ∈ Λ(t). By taking Δ = Λ(t), it now remains to show that Λ(s)can(R i )Λ(t). Assume otherwise, i.e., that there is a γ ∈ Λ(t)
In the construction of Δ (N k , s) , st = i , and thus includes i γ as a conjunct. But Δ(N k , s) also contains ¬ i γ as a conjunct. This contradicts the coherence of N k , and shows that the assumption was wrong.
A truth lemma can now be shown:
The proof is by induction over ψ . Sinceφ ∈ Λ 0 (y),φ is thus satisfied by M. It remains to be shown that M has all the properties we require of a model: 
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c ϕ w )-but that contradicts the Trichotomy axiom. Thus, COMPL must hold. STRICT As in the COMPL case, we use the fact that M is named and let ϕ w be the formula uniquely true in w.
Assume that STRICT does not hold. This means that there are w and u for which either (i) not R INTERSECTION As in the COMPL case, we use the fact that M is named and let ϕ w be the formula uniquely true in w.
Assume that INTERSECTION does not hold. This means that there are w and u for which either (i) R C wu and not ( i∈C R i )wu, or (ii) not R C wu and ( i∈C R i )wu. Consider case (i). Then there is a i ∈ C such that ¬R i wu, and
) is true in a world w if and only if there is a unique world in which p is true. Let
axiom Intersect 1 .
INTERSECTION-STRICT
As the INTERSECTION case, using axioms Intersect 2 and Intersect 4 . P
Corollary 3. MCGL is sound and complete with respect to the class of all coalitional games.
Proof. First we define mappings between models and games. Given a game Γ = (N, Ω, V , 1 , . . . , m ) and an interpre-
when p ∈ Θ , and letting the remaining relations in M be defined by the semantic restrictions on models. Conversely, given a model M, we define g(M) = (Γ, π ) as follows:
For soundness, let ϕ. By soundness w. r. t. models (Theorem 9), f (Γ, π ), w | ϕ for any Γ, π , so Γ, π , w | ϕ. For completeness, assume that ϕ is consistent. By completeness w.r.t. models (Theorem 10), M, w | ϕ for some M, w. Then also g(M), w | ϕ. P
Expressing game properties
The fact that an outcome w of a coalitional game Γ is in the core of Γ , can be expressed as follows.
and for every coalition C and every outcome ω such that (ω, ω ) ∈ a i for every i ∈ C , ω / ∈ V (C). This holds iff ω is in the core of Γ . P
We can now express the fact that the core is non-empty:
Proof. The core of Γ is non-empty iff either ω is in the core, or v is in the core for some v = ω. In the first case,
Imputations can be characterised as follows.
Compare MCM and MIMP-the logical characterisation highlights the similarities and differences between the core and imputation concepts.
Moving on to stable sets, we first characterise the existence of objections to some imputation. The following formula expresses a more general property, namely that there exists a C -s-objection which satisfies some formula α. Proof. Assume that ω is an imputation (the other case is trivial). (Γ, ω) | MOBJ(C , α) iff there is an imputation ω such that every i ∈ C strictly prefers ω over ω, and there is an outcome ω such that every i ∈ C weakly prefers ω over ω , (Γ, ω ) | α and ω ∈ V (C). P Of course, now MOBJ(C , ) (for some tautology ) is true in imputation ω iff there exists a C -s-objection to ω.
Characterising stable sets and the bargaining set in mcgl is not as straightforward. Formulae are interpreted in single outcomes, and unlike in cgl we cannot name outcomes in formulae. But a set of outcomes is precisely what is denoted by a formula: let ϕ Γ = {ω: Γ, ω | ϕ} be the extension of formula ϕ in game Γ . For example, we have that MC M Γ is the core of Γ . We can characterise stable sets in the following sense: we can describe exactly the formulae whose extensions are stable sets.
Proof. Let ξ be the formula on the right hand side of | . Γ | ξ iff for every ω: (i) if ω ∈ γ Γ then ω is an imputation; (ii) if ω ∈ γ Γ then there is no C -s-objection to ω for any C , which is a member of γ Γ and (iii) if ω ∈ γ Γ then there is a C -s-objection to ω for some C , which is a member of γ Γ . This holds iff γ Γ is a stable set. P However, note that the theorem above does not guarantee that given a stable set Y there necessarily exists a formula γ such that γ Γ = Y .
Proof examples
We here illustrate the proof theory of mcgl. Before we formally prove some well known properties of coalitional games in Example 6, we discuss some general proof theoretic principles.
Definition 6.
Given the operator D , we can define universal 'everywhere' and 'somewhere' operators A and E, respectively:
Clearly, Aϕ is equivalent to ¬E¬ϕ, and Eϕ equals ¬A¬ϕ.
Lemma 7.
The following is a useful modal principle.
Proof. Let ML denote basic Modal Logic properties.
The following lemma summarises some useful mcgl properties. Lemma 8.1 expresses that if agent i strictly prefers outcome y over x, while he also prefers z over y, then he strictly prefers z over x. To prove this, we need the axioms Strict 1 and Strict 2 . Then item 3 of the same lemma says that a similar kind of transitivity holds for the coalitional preferences. But the reader should be aware that the relation for C s is not the strict version of the relations for C ; rather, it is the intersection of the strict relations for i, with i ∈ C . It is in fact not hard to show that the axiom corresponding to Strict 1 is not valid for C s : we do this in item 2. Items 4, 5 and 6 are easy consequences of the definition of E, A and MOBJ(C , ·).
Lemma 8.
The following are some properties of mcgl.
A is a box operator, in particular, it satisfies Nec and K .
Proof.
(1) A derivation is the following. 
As an example, Paste(Op, r ∧ ¬q, r ∧ i (r ∧ ¬q)) = Paste(Op, r ∧ ¬q, r) ∧ Paste(Op, r ∧ ¬q, i (r ∧ ¬q)) = r ∧ i Paste(Op, r ∧ ¬q, (r ∧ ¬q) = r ∧ i (Op ∧ r ∧ ¬q).
Before commenting on this definition, we formulate a lemma. 
Lemma 9 (Pasting Lemma
, and this again, would identify two successor states (by saying they have the same unique name): we have
, and would the Pasting Lemma hold for Paste * (·, ·, ·), we would conclude
, which is obviously undesirable.
Note that in our logic mcgl every operator has a converse (D is its own converse). In other words, we can apply the pasting lemma. To do this in order to prove C s C r → C s r, fix the following parameters in the pasting lemma:
According to the lemma, in order to prove C s C r → C s r, it is sufficient to prove
Using the definition of Paste(·, ·, ·) and of Op, this boils down to proving
A proof is given in Fig. 3 . Taut   Fig. 4 . Deductive proof for Example 6.1. 
item 2 of this lemma Example 6. The following properties concerning the core and stable sets are now derivable:
(1) The core is a subset of any stable set. In our object language, this is written as:
No stable set is a proper subset of any other. This is represented as:
If the core is a stable set then it is the only stable set. We represent this as:
(1) We will show that Aϕ is derivable, and hence Nec cannot be applied to them. A proof is given in Fig. 4 . In the proof, note that 1a, 1b, and 1c together directly follow from assumption st(p), and 2 denotes MCM. The goal is to derive p from them. 
Logical comparisons
In this section we compare the two logics cgl and mcgl introduced in Sections 3 and 4 respectively, first to each other and then to Coalition Logic.
cgl vs. mcgl
We have introduced two logics, cgl and mcgl, both interpreted in coalitional games. We know that the former is very expressive when it comes to finite games, while the latter can express many interesting properties also of games with infinitely many outcomes. In this section, we make the relationship between the two logics more precise.
First, observe that, while formulae of both logics express properties of coalitional games, an mcgl formula is interpreted as a property of a given outcome of a game. A cgl formula, on the other hand, is interpreted as a general property of the game. Of course the cgl outcome language L o is also interpreted "locally" in a given outcome, but it is not so interesting to compare L o to the mcgl language because the former is not very expressive. However, the main cgl (cooperation) language L c allows us to refer to particular outcomes in a formula, so a property of a given outcome can be written in cgl as a property of a game by referring to the outcome in the formula. cgl can express any property of finite games (Theorem 1), so it must be able to express any property mcgl can express about a particular outcome in such a game. While we already know that this holds, an actual mapping from the mcgl language to the cgl language might be of interest. We now provide such a mapping. Assume that Γ is a finite coalitional game. Given an mcgl formula ϕ and an outcome ω of Γ , we define a 
i.e., the property of a given outcome ω that there exist a ω ∈ V ({i}) such that ω i ω. This property is expressible for finite games by the cgl formula ω ∈Ω ( {i} ω ∧ ω i ω). However, given an arbitrary cgl formula we now construct two infinite games, one which has the property and one which does not, which are indiscernible by the cgl formula. Note that in cgl (unlike in mcgl), the logical language is parameterised by a set of outcomes, and formulae are interpreted by games over the same set of outcomes. Thus, we fix a set of outcomes Ω, and we assume that Ω is infinite. We assume that Ω contains an outcome ω. Let ϕ be a cgl formula over Ω. Let ω = ω be an outcome in Ω not mentioned (as a symbol in the outcome language) in ϕ. Such an outcome exists, since there are assumed to be infinitely many outcomes, and only finitely many can occur in ϕ. Let 
The inductive step is straightforward. We now show that for every sub-formula ψ of ϕ, we have that Γ | cgl ψ iff Γ | cgl ψ . For the base case, ψ = ω 1 j ω 2 . For j = i we are done immediately, so let j = i. Γ | cgl ψ iff ω 1 i ω 2 iff, since (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (ω , ω) (it was assumed that ω is not mentioned in ϕ and ψ is a sub-formula of ϕ),
The other cases in the inductive step are straightforward. P Proposition 3 shows that mcgl can express properties of infinite games which cannot be expressed in cgl. An example of such a property (used in the proof of the proposition) is that for a given outcome ω there exist an ω ∈ V ({i}) such that ω i ω. Another, related, example is the expression of the property of ω being in the core. The cgl formula CM(ω) only expresses this property under the assumption of a finite set of outcomes; the mcgl formula MCM is true in an outcome of a game iff the outcome is in the core, regardless of whether the set of outcomes is finite or not. Of course, mcgl is not strictly more expressive, since, e.g., cgl (still) can refer to particular outcomes directly.
In addition to the ability to express properties such as core membership and core emptiness of infinite games, mcgl has another main advantage over cgl: succinctness. While mcgl cannot express everything cgl can express, the properties it can express can often be expressed much more succinctly (even for finite games). Again, consider the expressions of non-emptiness of the core, CNE and MCNE for cgl and mcgl, respectively. CNE will typically be a much longer expression, and its size increases quadratically with the number of outcomes in the game while the size of MCNE does not depend on the number of outcomes at all.
Coalition logic
As we noted in Section 2.1, it may be rather tempting to believe that the outcomes of coalitional games can be interpreted as states, and that the characteristic function can be interpreted as an effectivity function, and that as a consequence Coalition Logic (cl) [27] could be interpreted directly in coalitional games. In this section, we compare the semantics of cl on the one hand and cgl on the other, and show that in fact there is a fundamental difference between the two approaches. We also do the same for mcgl.
We first give a very brief review of some of the concepts of cl. 
Formulae of coalition logic, and their satisfaction in states s of coalition models M, are defined as follows 10 :
A formula ϕ is valid, | ϕ, if it satisfied by every state in every coalition model.
cgl vs. cl
If we take the set of atomic propositions to be In other words, a coalitional game Γ and a coalition model M, defined over atomic propositions Φ 0 above and having states Ω ∪ {t}, are outcome-equivalent iff for any ϕ 1 ∈ L c , any ϕ 0 ∈ L o and any ω ∈ Ω, we have both:
A natural question then is: given a game, does there exist an outcome-equivalent coalition model? The answer, given by the following theorem, is "no", except for certain very special classes of games. The latter is the class of games where V (C) = {ω} for all coalitions C = N, for some fixed outcome ω ∈ Ω. To give them a name, we will call such games limited games, since, first, most games are not of this kind and, second, they are not very interesting. The only coalition in a limited game which possibly can select an outcome different from the fixed outcome ω is the grand coalition. 
Observe that V (C) = ∅ for any coalition C = ∅. This follows from (ii) and (2): 
We show that for any coalition C = ∅ and any
For the direction to the right, assume that ω ∈ V (C). Γ, ω | ω (note the dual role of ω as both an outcome and a formula),
For the direction to the left, let {ω} ∈ E(t)(C ). Since, again, ω M = {ω}, by (2) there is a ω ∈ V (C) such that Γ, ω | ω. This is only the case when ω = ω ∈ V (C).
For any non-empty disjoint coalitions C 1 and C 2 :
We prove (4)- (6): (4) Assume otherwise, that ω 1 ∈ V (C 1 ) and ω 2 ∈ V (C 2 ) and ω 1 = ω 2 . By (3), {ω 1 } ∈ E(t)(C 1 ) and {ω 2 } ∈ E(t)(C 2 ), and by superadditivity it must be the case that ∅ = {ω 1 } ∩ {ω 2 } ∈ E(t)(C 1 ∪ C 2 ), but this contradicts (i). Thus, (4) must hold.
(5) Assume that ω ∈ V (C 1 ); we show that ω ∈ V (C 2 ). Since V (C 2 ) is non-empty, let ω ∈ V (C 2 ). By (4), ω = ω. Thus ω ∈ V (C 2 ). By a symmetric argument, ω ∈ V (C 2 ) implies that ω ∈ V (C 1 ). (6) Since V (C 1 ) is non-empty, there is an ω 1 ∈ V (C 1 ). If ω 2 ∈ V (C 1 ), then ω 2 ∈ V (C 2 ) by (5) and ω 1 = ω 2 by (4). Thus,
Let a, b ∈ N such that a = b (existence is ensured by the assumption of more than one player). By (5) and (6) There is a d ∈ N such that C and {d} are disjoint, so by (5) V (C) = V ({d}) = {ω 1 }, which shows that Γ is limited. P Thus, in general, a coalitional game is not simply a coalition model with outcomes as states. Even though the language of Coalition Logic is similar to the language of cgl, it follows from Theorem 14 that we cannot use the semantic rules of Coalition Logic directly to say whether a formula is true or not in a coalitional game. The main reason is that a difference between outcomes in coalitional games and states in coalition models is that an outcome is local to the coalition which chooses it, while states are global. As a consequence, while it is perfectly possible in a coalitional game that both a coalition C can choose outcome ω (ω ∈ V (C)) and a coalition C , C and C disjoint, can choose outcome ω (ω ∈ V (C )) when ω = ω, it is not possible in a coalition model that both C is effective for {ω} and C is effective for {ω }. The proof of Theorem 14 shows that in general there is no playable effectivity function corresponding, in the sense of (3), to a characteristic function.
When it comes to logical properties of the two logics, in the form of valid formulae, it is straightforward to see that the logics differ. To compare validities, we must take the set of atomic propositions Φ 0 for cl as defined above, and it is the formulae in L c which are relevant since they are formulae of both logics (L o are formulae of cl in this case, but not of cgl).
Theorem 15.
There are formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ L c such that (here we use subscripts on the satisfiability relations with the obvious meaning):
Proof. Let C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ and ω 1 = ω 2 ∈ Ω. Take ϕ = ( C 1 ω 1 ∧ C 2 ω 2 ) → (ω 1 ∧ ω 2 ). This formula (superadditivity) is valid in cl, but not in cgl. To see the latter, observe that in fact ¬ C (ω 1 ∧ ω 2 ) is valid in cgl for any C when ω 1 = ω 2 (and there are obviously games where the antecedent of ϕ holds). This immediately gives us the second claim: take ψ = ¬ C (ω 1 ∧ ω 2 ). ψ is not valid in cl. Another example is to take ϕ = C 1 ω → C 2 ω, where C 1 ⊆ C 2 (coalition monotonicity). P
In other words, the axiomatisation of cgl is indeed different from that of cl.
mcgl vs. cl
The languages of cl and mcgl are similar, too. Under the surface of the syntactic similarities, however, is a bigger conceptual difference than between cl and cgl. In the two latter logics, the meaning of an expression of the form C ϕ is related to what the coalition C can achieve or make come about. The intended meaning of C ϕ in mcgl is fundamentally different: it means that C prefers ϕ. One could nevertheless ask whether a coalition model could "emulate" a coalition model under this interpretation, and we now discuss that question. The language of cl can be seen as a subset of the mcgl language. To compare the two types of models we need the same language. Thus, we fix the set of agents N, and we consider the restricted mcgl the language of cl when the latter is restricted such that expressions of the form ∅ ϕ are not allowed. In a sense, L − is the least common denominator between the two respective languages.
We thus say that a coalitional game Γ and a coalition model M are equivalent if they are defined over the same set N of agents, Φ 0 = {p C : C ∈ C}, Θ = ∅, S = Ω, and for every ϕ ∈ L − , Γ, ω | ϕ iff M, ω | ϕ for every ω ∈ Ω.
The following Theorem 16 shows, in a similar way to Theorem 14, that except for very trivial games, mcgl properties of coalitional games do not correspond to cl properties of coalition models.
Two coalitional games Γ 1 , Γ 2 are logically equivalent (w.r.t. L − ) if they have the same set of agents and the same set of outcomes Ω and it is the case that for any formula ϕ ∈ L − , Γ 1 , ω | ϕ iff Γ 2 , ω | ϕ. Proof. Assume that Γ, ω | ϕ iff M, ω | ϕ, for any ω and ϕ ∈ L − . Let ω be an outcome. Let C ∈ C, and let C ⊆ C .
Playable effectivity functions are coalition-monotone: we have that E(ω)(C ) ⊆ E(ω)(C ) ([27] , Lemma 3.1). This means that M, ω | C ϕ → C ϕ, and thus that Γ, ω | C ϕ → C ϕ, for any ϕ. It is easy to see that Γ, ω | C ϕ → C ϕ for any ϕ, from the semantics of mcgl. Thus, we have that Γ, ω | C ϕ iff Γ, ω | C ϕ (7) for any ω, any ϕ, and any C ⊆ C .
Let Γ be like Γ , except that i = 1 for every i ∈ N (all agents have the same preferences). We argue that Γ and Γ are logically equivalent w.r.t. L − . This can be shown by structural induction over ϕ: the p C , ¬, ∧ cases are straightforward, so it suffices to show that Γ, ω | C ψ iff Γ , ω | C ψ for any C and ω and ψ under the induction hypothesis. Γ, ω | C ψ iff, by (7), Γ, ω | N ψ iff, again by (7), Γ, ω | {1} ψ iff there is a ω ∈ Ω such that ω 1 ω and Γ, ω | ψ . By the induction hypothesis and the facts that ω 1 ω iff ω i ω for any i and i = j for any i, j, this holds iff Γ , ω | C ψ . Thus, Γ is logically equivalent to Γ . P Again, it is easy to see that the two logics differ on the level of validities (in the language L − ).
Theorem 17.
There are formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ L − such that (here we use subscripts on the satisfiability relations with the obvious meaning):
Proof. Let C ⊆ C . Take ψ = C γ → C γ for some arbitrary γ . It is easy to see that ψ is valid in mcgl (if everyone in C prefers γ then everyone in C prefers γ ) but not in cl (a coalition can typically achieve more than its proper subsets). Take ϕ to be the converse; ϕ = C γ → C γ . ϕ is valid in cl (coalition monotonicity), but it is easy to see that it is not valid in mcgl. P
Discussion and future work
In summary, we have introduced two different logics for representing and reasoning about coalitional games without transferable payoffs. We presented Coalitional Game Logic (cgl), gave a complete axiomatisation for it, showed it was expressively complete with respect to finite coalitional games, showed that the satisfiability problem was np-complete, gave a decision procedure for the logic, showed how the logic could be used to capture a range of solution concepts for finite coalitional games, and finally, showed formally why the logic was fundamentally different to existing cooperation logics. We presented Modal Coalitional Game Logic (mcgl), used it to characterise solution concepts for general (not necessarily finite) coalitional games, and gave a complete axiomatisation of it. cgl is formally more expressive than mcgl, but can only be used to express properties such as non-emptiness of the core for games with finitely many outcomes. mcgl can on the other hand express such properties also of games with infinitely many outcomes, and in addition more succinctly.
Logics for reasoning about properties of coalitions in general and cooperation between agents in particular have received much attention lately, the most prominent frameworks being Pauly's Coalition Logic (cl) and Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman's atl. By using standard tools and techniques developed in AI and computer science, we can employ such logics for, e.g., model checking, automated theorem proving and automated synthesis of models. The key construct of cl/atl is of the form C ϕ, where C is a coalition, with the intended meaning that C can achieve ϕ. Syntactically, such logics resemble cgl in particular, and so it is natural to ask whether we could just use cl/atl to represent properties of coalitional games. What are the practical differences between the logics we have developed in this paper and cl-what, if anything, can be done with the former that cannot be done with the latter? For example, can we express properties such as non-emptiness of the core in cl? Let us give some answers. The results of Section 5.2 imply that we cannot directly use cl/atl for this purpose and, more importantly, that cl/atl and cgl are fundamentally different logics, with quite different validities. In contrast, cgl can be directly and transparently used for this purpose, since it is interpreted over coalitional games. We showed that, mcgl, too, is fundamentally different from cl/atl.
In future work, the computational complexity of mcgl should be studied. In our complexity analysis for cgl we assumed an explicit representation for games. In some circumstances this assumption might not be practical, and more succinct representations of games must be used. Several succinct representations of coalitional games have been studied in the literature [8, 9, 20] , and in future work the complexity of model checking against such representations should be studied. This is particularly relevant for games with an infinite set of outcomes, which obviously must be finitely represented. One particular class of games that have an infinite set of outcomes when modelled as games without transferable utilities is of course the class of games with transferable utilities. Model checking cgl and mcgl directly against succinct representations of TU games (such as marginal contribution nets [20] ) is one particularly interesting possibility. Also very interesting for future work is to find restricted classes of games that are tractable with respect to satisfiability checking (for both cgl and mcgl).
It would also be interesting to consider the logical characterisation of other solution concepts for coalitional games [24] . The Shapley value, in particular, would be interesting to analyse. A key issue would be how to capture the additivity axiom of the Shapley value, since this seems to require quantifying over games. Perhaps the obvious line of attack would be to consider NTU versions of the Shapley value-several have been proposed in the literature.
